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 Abstract 
Uganda is one of the African countries that have decentralized its education 
system. This country-specific paper examines the implementation process and the 
way forward to decentralizing education in a developing country. There have 
been gains and challenges from decentralization and processes linked to it.  While 
the implementation of Universal Primary Education in 1997 
increased significantly school enrollment as well as the number of 
classrooms; on the other hand,  student-teacher and student-resources ratio 
also increased, and corruption and mismanagement of resources remained a 
challenge. 
 Résumé 
Uganda est un des pays d'Afrique qui ont décentralisé leur système 
d'enseignement.  Cet article spécifique sur un seul pays examine les processus 
d'exécution et la façon d'avancer la décentralisation dans un pays au cours de 
développement.  Il y a des gains et aussi des problèmes provenant de la 
décentralisation et des processus qui l'accompagnent. L'application de la loi 
"Éducation primaire universelle" en 1997 a augmenté considérablement l' effectif 
des écoles et le nombre des classes mais le rapport élèves/instructeurs ainsi que 
celui entre élèves et ressources ont aussi augmenté, et la corruption et la 
mauvaise administration des ressources constituent encore des obstacles. 
Introduction 
 Developing and developed countries are decentralizing their education systems. 
In some countries, especially developing countries, educational decentralization is 
part of a larger exercise of devolving all public services. In sub-Saharan Africa the 
factors that encourage centralization include positive effects such as political 
stability and economic development, as well as push factors like existing regional 
inequalities and inadequacies, real and perceived, of central governments. 
Multilateral and bilateral donor communities are encouraging countries in the 
South to decentralize and/or privatize public services. Among these countries 
Uganda has proceeded quickly in an almost all-at-once decentralization strategy 
(Naidoo, 2002; Steiner, 2006). 
In Uganda, decentralization is not totally new. Regional governments 
mainly in the form of monarchies and chiefdoms were abolished in 1966, four 
years after independence (Mushemeza, 2003). The post independence constitution 
of Uganda, laid a legal framework for re-decentralization based on regional 
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governments but this never took off. The current Ugandan government 
administered some decentralization in the areas under its control in the early 
1980s while it was still a guerilla force called the National Resistance Army (now 
a political force called National Resistance Movement). After it came to power in 
1986, the government adopted country-wide decentralization, cost sharing and 
privatization as policies supported by multinational donor agencies such as the 
World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). To date 
most government-administered services (except a few, such as the police and the 
army) that have not yet been privatized are decentralized. These include primary 
healthcare, education, basic services in water and sanitation, feeder roads and 
agricultural extension. Decentralization has changed the delivery of public 
services, particularly education. 
Education has been decentralized to local governments beginning with 
primary (an equivalence of elementary) education. Many programs have been put 
in place to facilitate decentralization of education service delivery. It appears that 
the decentralization of education has been more effectual at the elementary level 
than at other levels.  
In the context of Uganda, decentralization is taken to mean the 
reassignment of some decision-making (management) authority, responsibility 
and tasks from the central government to local governments. Legal, financial, 
administrative and political management of public functions has become the 
responsibility of the local community, under the leadership of Local Councils 
(LCs). Decentralization appears to be based on the governance idea of 
subsidiarity: matters should be handled by the smallest (or lowest) authority. 
Subsidiarity means that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, 
performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more 
immediate or local level. Central authorities delegate management to sub-national, 
municipal or local units (Naidoo, 2002). There are varying degrees to which this 
delegation happens, ranging from deconcentration at the lower end, through 
delegation, to devolution at the upper extreme. To some scholars and some 
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, privatization is a form of 
devolution (Hanson, 1998; Suzuki, 2002; UNESCO, 2004). 
Deconcentration involves the spatial relocation of decision–making; 
some administrative responsibility is transferred to lower level governments. 
Because it is the lowest form of decentralization, deconcentration, also referred to 
as administrative decentralization, involves the transfer of tasks and responsibility 
but not of authority (Hanson, 1998; Naidoo, 2002; UNESCO, 2004).  
Under moderate decentralization—delegation—the transferred decision-
making authority may be withdrawn from the local government at the discretion 
of the central unit. Delegation involves the transfer of fiscal and administrative 
tasks but not of political tasks.  
When the highest degree of authority, which includes political and 
market responsibility for governing, is transferred to the local government 
devolution is said to be taking place. Devolution involves the creation or 
strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-national units of governments. Naidoo 
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(2002) compares the status of education decentralization in six sub-Saharan 
African countries including Tanzania and Ghana. He identifies Uganda as the only 
example of devolution. Devolution of education is political and financial 
(UNESCO, 2004). It goes hand in hand with the introduction of market forces to 
the system through privatization. In Uganda elementary education was 
universalized in 1997. Plans are underway to universalize secondary education in 
2007. With the case of devolution, it is crucial to asses the risks of shedding 
financial responsibility to local governments and to communities. 
 
Historical Considerations 
The Ugandan education system was one of the best in Sub-Saharan Africa (Odaet, 
1990; Ssekamwa, 1997). During the economic and political instabilities it was 
resilient to the inadequacies of central government (Heynman, 1983; Paige, 2000) 
and to political and economic difficulties that ensued. As in other former colonies, 
Christian missionaries introduced formal schooling in Uganda decades before 
British control over Uganda was signed in 1890. Missionaries and other foreign 
groups such as East Indians were in charge of founding, administering and 
funding schools (Odaet, 1990). Local Ugandans, mainly traditional chiefs had a 
role, in the spirit of self-help, to provide building materials, land and labor 
(Ssekamwa, 1997). The willingness of communities to contribute in cash and kind 
is a traditional strength of education in Africa. The missionary-founded schools 
were built on various Western models of education.  A majority of these schools 
had coherent structures and strong religious traditions. The missionaries supplied 
human resources, adopted curriculum and provided textbooks and equipment. It is 
after one of the traditional kingdoms, the Kingdom of Buganda became a British 
Protectorate that all schools became the domain of the British Empire, with 
English as the official language of instruction (Odaet, 1990).  But the colonial 
government did not yet involve itself in establishing, financing and administering 
schools.  
Around 1920, the Uganda protectorate government gradually began to 
assist the missionaries in the provision of education. The central government 
began constructing public schools and aiding schools with grants. In 1963 the 
Education Act was passed to place all grant-aided schools under the control of the 
government. This progressively curtailed the control of schools by racial and 
religious bodies, but major differences remained among schools founded by 
different bodies.  
In 1970 a second Education Act was introduced to encourage the 
establishment of private schools in Uganda. This act streamlined the requirements 
and procedures for establishing and operating a private school (Ssekamwa, 1997). 
A few more church-founded schools and a couple of international schools were 
established. Private colleges were also established. Most education policy and 
planning commissions and reviews, prior to and after independence in 1962, 
recommended more support by central government for academic secondary 
schools and tertiary institutions. Smyth (1970) explains that secondary education 
was seen to enhance economic development and was seen as a way of increasing 
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the number of Africans in responsible positions—Africanization—that was 
urgently needed with independence inevitably coming. The most support for 
expansion that primary schools got was indirectly through increased output of new 
teachers from existing training colleges. Many primary schools lacked some of the 
basic facilities particularly textbooks and equipment.  
Since the end of the war a couple of national education plans have shaped 
the education system of Uganda: the 1987 Education Policy Review Commission 
(EPRC) which reported on the state of the system of education after the political, 
military and economic turmoil of 1970-1980’s. The EPRC made 
recommendations including change in focus to accommodate the long held desire 
of basic primary education. It underscored the role of science and mathematics for 
national development and social transformation. The Education Bill (2000) 
revised and updated the 1970 Education Acts and provided for a more 
contemporary framework. With the post war government many changes in the 
Legal framework took place including The National Constitution for the Republic 
of Uganda that underscored education as a right of every Ugandan, and the 
Republic of Uganda Local Government Act (1997) that transferred Primary and 
Secondary Education services to Local Governments at the district level-- an 
example of decentralization of education delivery. Many programs have been put 
in place to facilitate decentralization of education service delivery, including: the 
Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP); Universal Primary Education 
(UPE); School Facilities Grant (SFG); Teacher Development and Management 
System (TDMS). In 1997 elementary education was universalized beginning with 
grades 1 to 4.  
The growth of private schools had been slow until the late 1990s. Several 
factors caused private education to grow exponentially in the late 1990s. These 
include economic and political stability; further, recovery from war increased 
school enrollments and Universal Primary Education (UPE). Many schools are 
now owned by individuals or groups of persons. In 2005, there were 11,850 
Government aided and 1,521 Private primary schools. There were 1651 
Government aided secondary schools and about 1898 private secondary ones 
(Bitamazire, 2005). Clearly at the post-primary level the private sector is over 
taking the public sector in education provision. This is without implications for 
the curriculum delivered. Private schools for children from middle-class and 
affluent families are better-equipped and staffed with more affluent teachers. 
There are also many impoverished private schools for students of low socio-
economic status and/or with low academic achievement. These schools are 
poorly-equipped and staffed with ill-paid teachers in order to keep the tuition 
affordable for parents. Before Universal Secondary Education (USE) is 
implemented there will be a steady growth of private secondary schools that 
survive on meager resources. Very few public schools have been built even at the 
secondary level where there is increasing need.  With the commercialization of 
higher education, private universities and colleges have emerged to supplement 
what used to be exclusively publicly-funded tertiary education. Efforts towards 
expansion and improvement of technical institutes are also limited. 
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Decentralization of the Ugandan education system is closely linked to other 
education reforms including the universalization of basic education, growing 
privatization and commercialization of higher education (Naidoo, 2002; 
UNESCO, 2004) 
Education decentralization in Uganda was not an educational reform, as 
it was in other countries such as Sri Lanka and Australia. The Ugandan process of 
decentralization, devolution of primary education, was mainly driven by national 
political will rather than by educational reform (Stasavage, 2005). This meant that 
legal frameworks of decentralization in general were helpfully modified and made 
compatible with those of decentralization in education.  
 
Decentralizing Administration 
In 1986, the National Resistance Movement government put in place a new 
system of local governance at first called Resistance Councils, another sign of a 
political form of decentralization. Resistance councils were later renamed Local 
Councils (LCs). The LC system is a five-level tiered system. It progresses from 
the zone (village) level (I), through parish (II), sub-county/division (III), 
county/sub-district (IV) and district/municipal (V) to the central government level. 
The first phase of the LC I to LC V tiered local governance was launched in 13 
(out of the then 45) districts. Councils at lower levels have nine five-yearly elected 
councilors including a chairman, vice chairman and secretaries representing 
women, youth and security. Starting from LC III going up to LC V, the councils 
are administrative bodies in addition to being political and legal bodies. LC III is 
headed by the sub-county chief in rural areas and by town clerks in towns. The 
district administration, LC V in the capital city is headed by the mayor; elsewhere 
it is headed by an administrative officer. Councilors, especially at the lower levels, 
are unpaid volunteers.1  Starting at LC II going up to the district, the service 
commission recruits and remunerates administrative personnel like sub-county 
chiefs and parish council agents. In 1993 the Local Government (Resistance 
Councils) Statute was passed to provide for the transfer of powers and resources 
to Local Councils.  
Currently the broader decentralization process in Uganda is guided by the 
1997 Local Government Act. With this Act, Resistance Councils were renamed 
Local Councils (LCs). Education was listed as one of the major public functions 
for which the highest level in the local hierarchy, the District council, was to be 
directly responsible (Local Government Act, 1997, Article 176(2) of the 
Constitution, Section 97 & 98). In the Act the levels of education that were to be 
decentralized were listed as nursery, elementary, secondary, trade education, 
special education and technical education. Higher and university education 
continued to lie outside the governance of local councils. The objectives of the 
Act were to: 
• give full effect to the decentralization of functions, powers, 
responsibilities and services at all levels of local governments; 
• ensure democratic participation in and control of decision making by 
the people concerned; 
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• establish a democratic, political and gender-sensitive administrative 
set-up in local governments; 
• establish sources of revenue and financial accountability; and 
• provide for the election of Local Councils.  
 
A Centralized Education System  
Before decentralization, all systems were centralized under the national 
government and the district/municipality governments. The districts implemented 
policies chosen by the central government. They carried out activities on behalf of 
the ministry of education. Key personnel included the Permanent Secretary and 
the national Chief Education Officer (CEO) at the national Ministry of Education 
level, and the District Education officer (DEO) at the district level.  Ssekamwa 
and Lugumba (1973) observe that during that time the key person who 
administered elementary schools’ educational service in any district was the 
District Education Officer (DEO). With the assistance of one or two assistant 
inspectors of schools attached to his office, the DEO advised elementary school 
head teachers. The DEO was, on behalf of the national Chief Education Officer 
(CEO), responsible for the inspection of elementary schools, in-service teacher 
education, professional development workshops and courses, transfer of teachers, 
and the administration of grants for school buildings, equipment, furniture and 
funds for elementary school teachers’ salaries. The DEO was answerable to the 
Permanent Secretary. 
The two-tiered centralized governance of education posed a problem for 
districts far away from the main national administrative city, Kampala. Worse 
still, many local areas were far from their district headquarters. Personnel at the 
district level were limited. The unequal access and other inequities were 
aggravated by political instability and the economic difficulties of the 1970s and 
1980s. At many times local plans could not be fully implemented because no 
particular unit—district or national—was responsible. There was also a 
widespread lack of key competent and skilled personnel. Other factors such as 
lack of training and capacity-building, along with growing divisions along tribal 
and regional lines also contributed to the inadequacy of centralization. The new 
government proposed decentralizing governance of public services as a panacea 
for all these challenges.  
 
Objectives of Decentralizing Uganda’s Education  
The government of Uganda perceived many benefits of decentralizing educational 
governance. It conceived that decentralization would: (a) eliminate what it saw as 
unnecessary bureaucratic channels, (b) reduce corruption by minimizing the 
number of office levels to be consulted, (c) boost the level of monitoring since 
there would be physical proximity of local governments, (d) result in the 
management of the education system according to local priorities (e) improve 
financial accountability since local people and personnel would be motivated to 
monitor local governance, and (f) raise local revenue to fund services.  
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In 1998 the government embarked on strengthening the decentralization 
system in order to improve the management and delivery of elementary education 
services. This also illustrated a shift in roles, from deconcentration to devolution. 
The districts ceased to be mere implementers of central government policies. The 
district staff base was expanded beyond supervisory roles to engage in spending, 
accounting, planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. They now receive 
capitation grants from the central Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
(MoFED). These funds are spent and accounted for according to guidelines 
provided by the national Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES). District 
councils also prepare district capacity-building plans and budgets. Each district, as 
a member of the national education planning process, prepares sector plans for 
district capacity-building. They draw plans such as for classroom construction and 
resource acquisitions that have to be approved by MoES. These district plans and 
budgets increasingly contribute to the central MoES planning and budgeting.  
Since educational decentralization was part of a wider political reform, it 
is unlikely that careful thought was given at the planning stage to far-reaching 
educational implications of decentralization and to how it would be interpreted in 
practice. It appears decentralization laws preceded workable models of 
decentralization. Although phasing in decentralization allows for experimentation 
and the possibility of revisions, Uganda chose the all-at-once strategy. All districts 
took responsibility of their education systems, whether they were ready or not.  
Post-Decentralization Ugandan Education System  
Although decentralization was phased in quickly at the regional level, at the 
school level decentralization appears to have proceeded more slowly. For 
elementary schools the District government is the highest point of reference and 
authority. Local authorities have financial control and general decision-making 
powers over elementary schools. The schools are accountable, through the 
subsequent levels of governance, to the Education Committee headed by the 
District Education Officer (DEO). This system of power-sharing has made 
decision-making quick and easy. But one wonders about the challenges that come 
with easy and quick decision-making in a developing system. At times decisions 
about education issues are made by personnel who have little experience in 
education governance. The success of decentralization depends on the question: 
How have education policy makers addressed the challenges that come with local 
governance in a country where resources are neither adequately nor evenly 
distributed? One way has been to strengthen both the central and local 
administrative infrastructure in support of educational decentralization. 
The New National Governance Structure 
In 1998 the Ministry of Education underwent post-constitutional restructuring. 
The central government began strengthening infrastructures and institutions at 
MoES. Many new national institutions were created and many roles were 
decentralized to districts. Central government now concentrates more on planning, 
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policy analysis, curriculum and examination reform, national assessment, and 
monitoring and evaluation.  Before decentralization three semi-autonomous 
institutions existed: National Curriculum Development Center (NCDC); Uganda 
National Examinations Board (UNEB); and National Council for Higher 
Education (NCHE). Under the new structure, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1 
(page 101), the MoES is comprised of eight departments for planning and policy 
analysis; a commissioner heads each department. A policy analysis unit, a 
resource centre, and three technical units (procurement, construction management 
and instructional materials) were established. In addition to institutions that 
existed before, there are six semi-autonomous institutions (see left of Figure 1, 
page 101) that have been established to handle more specialized functions of the 
Ministry. These include Education Standards Agency (ESA), Education Service 
Commission (ESC), Uganda National Council for UNESCO. Many activities are 
coordinated by multiple units, institutions and departments.  
No institution was eliminated: NCDC and UNEB still exist, and NCHE 
was transformed into a department and two institutions. Many activities are 
coordinated by multiple units, institutions and departments. For example, to 
review the curricula, the government set up a task force that involved different 
actors mainly at the Ministry. MoES outlined its aspirations for the new 
curriculum before forwarding the responsibility to the NCDC (MoES, September 
2003). Evidently, support structures with defined roles are in place to support the 
implementation of decentralization of education. For instance, ESIP is responsible 
for building the capacity of district and local governments effectively and 
efficiently to deliver public educational services and to assure the quality of 
privately delivered services. The TDMS program is intended to improve quality 
and equity in the provision of elementary education through improved teacher 
training, development and professional support.    
In the process of building local devolved systems centralized 
bureaucracies were strengthened. Strong central regulation in such areas as 
curriculum design, assessment, teacher development and higher education 
remained. This is not surprising for a country where political and economic 
motives were central to decentralization. Naidoo (2002) dubs this a case of intense 
state control of some functions being coupled with greater decentralization of 
other aspects. It is centralized decentralization. The co-existence of both 
processes is very supportive but is not without contradictions. It is likely to 
produce lived tensions for school principals, teachers, parents and the local 
community. 
 
New District Governance Structure 
At the district level some institutions were created to support the office of the 
DEO. With decentralization, key personnel in the district include: the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO), who is the district accounting officer, and the 
District Inspector of Schools (DIS), whose work is more pronounced at the 
elementary level. The District Education officer (DEO) remains the head of the  
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education department and Education Committee at the district to whom the head 
teachers (school principals) are answerable.  
 
Figure 1. Structure of Central Education 
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All the district education staff and institutions, including the DEO, 
operate under the control and supervision of the CAO. The CAO is an appointed 
member to the tier V District Local Council (DLC). The DLC is the main 
budgetary unit in the district. The DEO is now directly answerable to the CAO, 
whereas in the past the DEO was answerable to the Permanent Secretary at the 
Ministry of Education. The DEOs are responsible for monitoring and supporting 
all schools within their districts, and they work with the CAO to develop plans 
and budgets. Through the District Service Commission (DSC), each district 
recruits and assigns elementary school teachers, as they do other public servants. 
The CAO receives funds for education in the form of school staff salaries, funds 
for school supplies and grants, which are dispatched to principals through the 
DEO. From the time elementary education was universalized the central 
government has been responsible for funding elementary education under the UPE 
program.  
Elementary schools report to the DEO and receive communication from 
the District Headquarters, but secondary and tertiary schools still primarily report 
to the Director of Education at the central government who then is answerable to 
the Permanent Secretary. By law, finance and administration are decentralized for 
elementary, secondary, and technical levels (Wamala, 2004). In practice, the shift 
in roles for the MoES from delivery of education to policymaking, investment 
management, and quality assurance is only at the elementary education level. 
Policy, budgeting and planning for secondary schools are not yet decentralized. 
This might be interpreted as a form of phased-in decentralization or as a selected 
focus at one level at the expense of the other. In secondary schools it is mainly the 
salaries of teachers and the capitation grant that are channeled through the 
decentralization structure. Other issues regarding secondary education, such as the 
recruitment and transfer of teachers, remain the responsibility of the ministry. As 
regards inspection, there is ambiguity as to whether the District Inspectorate staff 
has anything practical to do with secondary schools. There is also a question about 
whether these staff are qualified enough to inspect secondary schools. 
Decentralization has had almost no effect on pre-elementary/kindergarten 
education and day care. This level of education remains in the private sector.  
 
Financial Decentralization 
In many Latin American and Caribbean countries educational administration has 
been decentralized. Educational finance has also been decentralized, but to a 
lesser extent. In Uganda financial decentralization is in the lead. 
 Through financial decentralization, education grants are calculated 
centrally and then released to the districts as conditional, non-conditional or 
equalization grants. Equalization grants are paid to local governments for giving 
subsidies or making special provision to the least developed districts (Local 
Government Act, 1997, section 84(4)). Conditional grants are budgeted for as 
capitation grants that are distributed to the schools in accordance with their 
enrolments. UNESCO (2004) suggests that school formula funding, based on 
enrollment, location and the like, can reduce the opportunities for corruption. 
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Capitation grants are spent on instructional and scholastic materials, on co-
curricular activities, on school management and on administration. Whereas a 
number of these are donor-specific initiatives, elementary teachers’ salaries, 
classroom construction, school capitation grants, support for the Teacher 
Development and Management System (TDMS), and funds for instructional 
materials are provided through a special programme, the general Poverty Action 
Fund (PAF). The PAF is the main source of financial support to elementary 
education. Currently, about 75 percent of the total PAF transferred for education 
and 72 percent of all government resources for education are provided through the 
districts (USAID, 2000).    
Among conditional grants are a variety of special expenditures aimed at 
supporting the curriculum: the School Facilities Grant (SFG), teacher salaries for 
elementary schools, UPE grants, and the Instructional Material Grant (IMG). The 
ministry sends funds for secondary school teacher salaries to schools through 
the district whereas salaries for elementary teachers are part of conditional grants 
that the district receives from the central government. The SFG supports 
communities’ efforts to improve the accessibility and quality of elementary school 
education. The target is to achieve better classroom facility ratios, which include a 
teacher-pupil ratio of 1:55, a desk-pupil ratio of 1:3, a latrine-pupil ratio of 1:40 
and at least four teachers’ houses per school (MoES fact file, 2003). The UPE 
capitation grant provides less than $10 per child per year for children who are in 
their first three years of elementary education. UPE grants and the IMG are aimed 
at providing adequate quantities of good quality instructional materials. The CAO 
receives and ensures the prompt disbursement of education grants to schools. The 
CAO accounts for these funds in a proper manner, and ensures that conditional 
monies such as the UPE grants are not diverted to other needs. Diversion of funds, 
especially at the school level, is a common challenge. 
Provision of infrastructure involves many activities and actors. Major 
activities include planning, budgeting, release of funds, accounting, reporting, 
monitoring and evaluation. These activities are done at the different levels: 
school/local community; sub-county, division, district, MoES, and by other 
concerned actors such as MoFED and the President’s office.  
The involvement of the local community that originally occurred through 
the Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) now takes place through the School 
Management Committee (SMC). SMCs include 7 appointed members and only 
two members elected by parents (Suzuki, 2002). SMCs are not unique to Uganda. 
They were established in Mali as well. In Uganda, SMCs and PTAs co-exist with 
varying powers; the former is responsible for UPE grants. These committees 
oversee school administration, development and improvement projects. The SMC 
is intended to be the increasingly empowered governance mechanism dealing with 
education locally.  
The unique structures through which centralization has been strengthened 
and decentralization implemented appear beneficial. Devolution, the higher 
extreme of decentralization, is said to have a low risk of long-term failure. The 
layered structures defined above may nevertheless present great risks for the 
Ugandan education system.  
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Decentralization has been practiced for almost a decade in Uganda, 
longer than many countries in Africa. In the next section, we draw on the literature 
on decentralization to theoretically tease out strong aspects and weak points of the 
Ugandan education decentralization process. Even though no experimentation 
phases were built into the process, analyzing the benefits and risks of the 
implementation structures is likely to allow Sub-Sahara African countries to learn 
from the experience of others at decentralization. Where professional will is led 
by political will there are likely to be large gaps between proclaimed policies and 
implementation practices. Uganda can learn from countries such as Spain and 
Nicaragua where educational reform policy, not national law, guided the process. 
For Caribbean and Latin American countries where national law guided the 
decentralization reform such an analysis will help policy makers to assess the 
benefits and risks of decentralization work as an educational reform. 
 
Benefits  
The education sector in Uganda has changed dramatically over a period 
of ten years. The most notable change is in access to primary education. 
In 1992, 2.4 million children enrolled with a gross enrolment ratio (GER) 
of 68 per cent and a net enrolment ratio (NER) of less than 40 per cent. 
Today more than 7 million children are enrolled, the GER is over120 per 
cent, and the NER over 80 per cent. There have also been significant 
changes in the number of and proportion of trained teachers, the 
classrooms built and available and the textbook purchase and distribution 
system. The implementation of the UPE program has meant an increase 
in resource flows from higher government in terms of grants, materials 
and construction funds. (Murphy, 2005, p. 139) 
 
Grade 1 Gross intake rate and Primary level gross enrolment ratio (see 
table 1) are the most commonly used statistics when illustrating the benefits of 
decentralization. Many funding agencies are more comfortable dealing directly 
with specific Ministries and with local communities. The central and local 
administrative infrastructures as well as primary school and private secondary 
school infrastructures are stronger today than they were before decentralization 
(Deininger, 2003). Some least-developed districts such as Kalangala are 
benefiting from the equalization grant. Community involvement in decision-
making is encouraged through school level policy-making by the school 
management committee and local councils (Suzuki, 2002). A detailed analysis of 
the Ugandan reforms shows that in fact some sub-county government officials are 
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Table 1. Uganda Education Data 
 




Surface area (000's 
Sq.Km) b   241 241 241   
Population total 
(Millions)    24.3 27.8 28.8   
Per capita GNI (US$) 190 320 230 260 250  607 507 
Adult literacy ratec (%)  56.1   66.8   61.7 
Primary level GERd (%) 73.2 68.7 74.3 127 125 118 93.1 104.4 
Secondary level GER (%) 10 12.5 12 15.9 18.6 16 29.8 45.2 
Tertiary level GER (%) 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.5 3.4  5.6 9.1 
Grade 1 Gross intake rate 
(%) 88.7 107.8 - 172.7 163.5 - 109.8 122.3 
Primary completion rate 
(%)    58.2 57.1  61.1 77.8 
School life expectancy 
(years)    10.6 10.4   9.7 
Progression to secondary 
(%)    40 36.2    
Repetition rate (%)    2 1.9   5.1 
Primary pupil-teacher 
ratio 34.5 28.5 35.2 52.7 50.1  50.3 42 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators database, April 2006 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/SummaryEducationProfiles/CountryData/G
etShowData.asp?sCtry=UGA,Uganda 
Notes. a SSA stands for Sub Saharan Africa. b Blanks represent unavailable statistics. c 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above). d GER stand for Gross 
Enrollment Ratio.  
 
They fulfill them when institutional rigidities do not prevent them from doing so 
(Steiner, 2006). In many schools, especially the missionary-founded schools and 
boarding schools, there was previously a lack of community involvement. With 
most administrative roles retained by the ministry and the district, and plus with a 
majority members of the SMC appointed by the central and local governments the 
perceived benefits of decentralization might not come to pass (Suzuki, 2002); for 
example, SMC’s minimized participation of and accountability to parents. As 
well, increased community participation may not necessarily result in increased 
choice and diversity.  
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Diversion of funds, irregular payments and decayed arrears plagued the 
education system into the late 1990s. Because of corruption among officials and 
slackened management measures there were chronic inefficiencies in transferring 
teachers’ salaries from the central government to district governments and then to 
the schools. Even getting new teachers appointed, posted and then enlisted on the 
payroll took years. Teachers would teach for years before they got their first 
salary. Salaries were terribly low. Salary arrears accumulated and some were 
written off after decades. Some teachers quit the teaching profession to try 
alternative means of survival;, others taught at private schools in addition to the 
public schools where they were posted. In rural areas many teachers took on 
casual labor jobs, opened up kiosks, or farmed to supplement their incomes. PTAs 
attempted to fill the gap by remunerating teachers and funding schools. This 
escalated the inequalities among schools, as parents of some schools were middle-
class. Also this lowered the teacher’s professional status as parents became 
employers of teachers.  Government attempted to abolish PTA fees and to curtail 
PTA responsibilities at the school but these efforts were unpopular among both 
parents and schools (Al-Samarrai, 2003) 
With the devolution of responsibility for elementary education to the 
district level, teachers’ salaries are now paid more promptly and the management 
of the payroll has improved. District administrators can manage their funds 
without being slowed down by the bureaucracies of the central government. 
Elementary school teachers are appointed, posted and remunerated over a period 
of no more than six months. (This is not yet the case for secondary school 
teachers, who suffer a recruitment freeze and are still appointed centrally.) 
Remitting teachers’ salaries through banks circumnavigates the diversion of 
salaries and other risks involved in cash payments. Prompt remuneration 
undoubtedly reduces teacher burnout, increases teacher retention rates and boosts 
teachers’ motivation and status in the community (Saito, 2000). 
Gershberg (2003) notes that information on the conditional grants to 
districts is published in the national press and provided to schools. This acts as a 
measure for increased accountability and transparency. District headquarters are 
required to display publicly the amount of UPE funds received and how they are 
planning to allocate them. Schools and sub-counties, in turn, must publicize their 
budgets and sources of funds. Monitoring and evaluation measures are put in 
place at all levels. The technical assistance units support the move from control to 
efficiency that came with decentralization. Further, there appears to be structural 
collaboration among major national institutions such as the Planning, Local 
Government and Education Ministries, along with the President’s office.  
 
Administrative Risks  
Geographic decentralization in Uganda has involved both existing districts and 
new districts created by the process. Many existing districts had some form of 
infrastructure, revenue and power. Thus the devolution process was somewhat 
supported. However, some existing problems of administrative weakness and 
inequity were imported into the new system. Even when the government has 
invested a lot of funds in infrastructure, there is a chance that weak and new 
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districts might be run on informal and personal principals such as whose child are 
you, and that rules may be poorly followed and policy implemented less 
rigorously. This has been the case for developing countries in Latin America. The 
same is true in Uganda. Preparing new districts to take on their responsibilities 
goes beyond preparing the physical infrastructure. Readiness checks need to be 
put in place to ensure sufficient trained personnel along with financial and 
community participation at the local level.  
It may appear more equitable to decentralize all regions at the same time 
and at the same pace. However, this method assumes that decentralization does 
not require a foundation. No time is allowed for experimentation and adjustment. 
Weaker and new districts do not get the opportunity to learn from stronger 
districts. Hanson (1998) warns that all at once decentralization may send a 
country into some form of chaos for the implementers. Even Spain, a developed 
country, implemented its decentralization program in phases.  
Privatization and support for private schools introduce new choices and 
diversification. Some schools, especially those that claim to be international, 
follow non-Ugandan policy and have their students learn non-Ugandan syllabi 
such as the Cambridge syllabi. With the establishment of over twenty new 
departments, institutions, programs and technical units, tools to safeguard the 
national educational policy appear to have been strengthened. As in Spain, 
decentralization is not likely to fragment the education system in Uganda because 
a lot of policy-making is still done at the national level. However, there is little 
chance that diversity and choice in schooling will be achieved. The national 
educational policy, school curriculum and syllabus frameworks, national 
assessment, teacher training and associated resource materials are still the 
ministry’s responsibility.  
Teacher education, especially in-service teacher education for 
administrators, teachers and participating community members, has been catered 
for by the Teacher Development and Management System (TDMS) and in the 
districts. Whether this professional development is taking into account the 
changing personal and professional needs of a decentralized system such as group 
dynamics, negotiation and public relations is a question that needs empirical 
study. In a USAID (2000) report it was noted that the quality of teaching and 
learning suffers from weak leadership and an irregular flow of resources.  
Decentralization aggravates needs for intensive, continuing training 
including financial training for administrative and educational personnel as well 
local authorities and parents (UNESCO, 2004). Strengthening leadership and 
management of a decentralized education system requires work not only at the 
district level but at the sub-county and even the parish levels. Strategies are 
complicated, entailing not only training in technical skills such as budgeting and 
data monitoring, but also higher-level skills such as political leadership and cross-
institutional collaboration. The number of districts whose capacity is inadequate 
for the tasks at hand multiplies the challenge.  
With both decentralization and centralization occurring simultaneously 
there is likely to be duplication of duties and resources. In a country where 
monarchy governments existed before centralization, one would hope that 
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decentralization would be synonymous with federalization. Instead, in Uganda 
cultural monarchies and decentralization uniquely run parallel to each other. In 
tribal regions such as Buganda, which have relatively cohesive kingdoms, there is 
tripling of systems: centralization, decentralization and federalization in the form 
of restored monarchies (Stasavage, (2005). Some duplication of resources has 
created depressing lived experience for teachers and students. One example is the 
introduction of district examinations for candidate classes. Learning and teaching 
now have to fit into the schedule of the regular school examinations, the district 
examinations and the final national examination. At the school level this is turning 
teaching and learning into an examination-focused practice.   
Gershberg (2003) argues that devolution produces centralization at the 
regional level, in part because sub-regional responsibilities might not be well 
articulated in the decentralization legislation. This is particularly negative where 
regional officials are found to be less in touch than national officials with citizen 
preferences. The emergence of centralized districts is a growing issue in Uganda. 
Worse still that the districts at times are out of touch with what happens at lower 
levels does work against the assumptions of decentralization. With core education 
decisions around curriculum and school issues still centralized either at the 
national or district level, local community participation is still very limited.  
Decentralization expanded the overall size of the bureaucracies to include 
LCs. This expansion does not necessarily imply an increase in efficiency. There is 
evidence that bureaucratic delays and centralized inadequacies have been curtailed 
by decentralization, but corruption seems to have multiplied. This is more limiting 
as corruption and non-professional management are now occurring at a minimum 
of three levels of governance: national, district and sub-county. 
Some combined advantages of decentralization and centralization are 
equitable allocation of resources and programmatic unity. These may be offset by 
diseconomies of scale, as seen in many Latin American countries. For a country 
with such a small national budget, subdividing it at sub-national levels inevitably 
increases administrative costs. 
Financial Risks  
Funding criteria need to be looked into. Payrolls with ghost teachers and 
accountability data with ghost students and resources are commonly reported in 
the local Ugandan press. Local finance management has created monitoring 
loopholes. Formula school funding is facing limitations of misreported needs. A 
common mismanagement method is to inflate the number of pupils in order to 
receive more funds. The reason why this malpractice continues unchecked is that 
correct data is not available (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003). The Ministry of 
Education collects data annually through the Educational Management 
Information System (EMIS). Due to misreporting, it is difficult to gather and 
aggregate educational statistics. In September 2003 the District Service 
Commission Secretary of a new district, Kiboga, was remanded for putting “ghost 
teachers” on the payroll  (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003).  
Corruption grows. Corruption has been witnessed in the process of 
transferring ferring finances from the central government to local governments. 
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It is not rare for funds budgeted for one use to be diverted to another. Some 
resources have been diverted. In the Gulu district, for example, part of the 
Ush 2.6 billion (approximately 1.4 million USD) meant for elementary 
teachers’ salaries was diverted in the financial year 1998- 1999, and another 
part was embezzled. Also funds for classroom construction were robbed 
during transportation. Districts such as Gulu have problems of accounting for 
their School Facilities Grant (SFG) fund (The New Vision, 23 August 2003). 
Construction, resource and salary funds are misappropriated or their 
release to beneficiaries is deliberately delayed. Decentralization creates new 
avenues for corruption. Corruption is tiered when deeper and systemic reasons for 
corruption in developing countries are not addressed. Education funds sometimes 
end up in private accounts of local government officials where they earn interest 
for the officials. At the school level, head teachers are usually responsible for 
malpractice, delay or nonpayment of wages, misappropriation of grants and 
outright theft (Royal Netherlands Embassy, 2003). Corruption of all types—
bribery, fraudulent reporting of data, shirking by employees, misuse of funds 
(UNESCO, 2004)—is taking place. Corruption, when it takes place in the 
education system, threatens the moral fabric of society.  
Different key stakeholders at various levels carry out monitoring activity 
for capitation grants. At the district level monitoring and evaluation measures are 
put in place by the many ministries as well as by the President’s office. Ministry 
of Education officials visit the district at least every two months to verify 
compliance and to appraise the district progress in the SFG implementation. The 
district monitors and evaluates the performance of schools and contractors. 
Monitoring is done at the school level by the District Inspector of Schools. The 
LCs and the SMCs do daily monitoring and evaluation of contractors and of the 
schools as well. But this local monitoring is weakened by high adult illiteracy 
rates (see Figure 1, page 105), lack of interest and lack of knowledge (Suzuki, 
2002) The monitoring level is evidently retroactive and therefore needs to be 
supported with other proactive measures 
 In relation to procurement, the School Facility Grant (SFG) is plagued 
by corruption in the Classroom Construction Program (CCP). Although primary 
schools have little capacity to plan and account for expenditures, the schools are 
responsible for selecting and overseeing local contractors, with the assistance of 
the district assistant engineer and other district personnel. Schools are responsible 
for applying the funds, hiring a suitable contractor, supervising the work, paying 
the contractor, and ensuring the maintenance of services delivered. In 2001 an 
SFG evaluation was done. Different construction elements, such as doors and 
roofs, were monitored for their quality. The outcome of the quality evaluation 
showed that out of 35 classroom projects only 14 showed no shortcomings.  On 
September 3, 2003, it was stated in a Special Audit Report from the Auditor 
General’s office that out of Ush [Uganda Shillings] 238m remitted to the Gulu 
district for the Schools Facilitation Grant, only Ush 17.2m was put to use. Ush 
40m was unaccounted for, another 178.5m was reimbursed to the Ministry of 
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Finance, and Ush 3.1m was spent on bank charges (New vision, October 01, 
2003)  
 There have been cases where education officials have been arrested for 
bribery when dealing with corruption cases. 
The principal of Moroto Core Elementary Teachers College has been 
arrested for allegedly attempting to bribe officials from the Inspector 
General of Government to suppress a case. … [together with the bursar 
they] attempted to bribe the officials with Ush 1 million. The duo was 
summoned by the IGG for several other allegations, concerning 
mismanagement of college funds and failure to give allowances to their 
tutors (Sunday Monitor, October 12, 2003, p. 4.). 
Not all districts registered the activities for which the funds were utilized. (This is 
reflected in the district profiles). Some districts did account for the capacity-
building funds (PAF report, April 2003). 
Parliament has considered alternatives for decentralizing the selection, 
procurement and distribution of textbooks. In light of the rampant corruption and 
mismanagement at both the school and district level, parliament decided to 
maintain centralized textbook procurement (USAID, 2000). Corruption increases 
education expenses. It is distorting decision making processes and undermining 
social values. That it is happening in the education sector defeats the main purpose 
of education (UNESCO, 2004). Uganda could learn from countries such as Brazil 
which has set stricter definitions for corruption, improved administrative and 
control procedures through training, regional offices and manuals (UNESCO, 
2004). 
In addition to boosting accountability, participation procedures need to 
be strengthened (Suzuki, 2002). There is a need to check situations where 
perceived benefits to the communities and to marginalized districts and 
stakeholders have been captured by the already privileged. In a way devolution of 
responsibility is also a form of pushing resource burdens to lower levels. A worst-
case scenario might arise years down the road, when local districts will be 
required to fund their public services. This would be a disaster for low revenue-
generating districts, which are in the majority in rural areas.  
Even though international donor agencies encourage decentralization as a 
way of reducing the national debt, it is not evident that decentralization solves the 
problem of limited central financial resources. The generation of more resources 
at the local level faces management and resource base inadequacies. The local tax 
base is very small in many rural districts. In some old districts that have been split 




Educational decentralization is complex and might be different from other forms 
of decentralization: it requires the will and strength of numerous systems, 
institutions and personnel. Educators might wish to work at a shared vision, 
including perceived out-comes and feared shortcomings of this reform at all 
levels, including the community level. Since the Ugandan decentralization 
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initiative was part of a larger political move, there are likely pockets of passive 
resistance among the actors. With the numerous units and departments in the 
Ministry of Education, along with tiered local governance at lower levels, one 
hopes that reform initiatives will not be diluted at every level in Uganda as they 
were in Venezuela (Hanson, 1998). UNESCO (2004) underscored the need to 
raise awareness of administrative officials about the philosophy of 
decentralization. To encourage participation in reform initiatives the Ministry 
should ensure that this is a win-win situation at both the local and national levels. 
Transferring positive financial and non-financial opportunities to the districts and 
subsequent levels is key. Hanson (1998) has identified wide collaboration as a 
component of successful decentralization. The Uganda national government has 
not dumped financial and administrative burdens onto the districts as Argentina 
did (Hanson, 1998). 
With decentralization, the government replaced Parent Teacher 
Associations (PTAs) with broader councils, School Management Committees 
(SMCs), which include members of the community. As was the case in Colombia, 
it was a political decision, not an educational one, to remove power from the PTA 
as an influential group that had started subsidizing teachers’ salaries and other 
school expenses (UNESCO, 2004). As the PTA’s power is removed, whether or 
not the local community will rise up to participate in the SMCs depends on the 
appointment procedures, level of establishment of the school and whether it is a 
boarding school or a private school. Although disempowering PTAs appears to be 
a way of keeping a balance between parental and community participation, many 
villages contain schools in which their children cannot afford to enroll. SMC 
committees might therefore not have any representation from parents of students 
at such schools.  
Councilors are elected positions in all five tiers. The President reshuffles 
the cabinet regularly. In countries where this is the case, it has been observed that 
the planning and implementation of decentralization is disrupted by the constant 
top-level personnel changes. In Uganda the Minister of Education and the state 
ministers at different levels of education have all regularly been reshuffled. Top-
level policy makers in education are usually not educators by profession. 
In the transition period from centralized to decentralized education 
delivery, clarity over roles and responsibilities has been a problem. This has been 
especially so between the CAO, DEO, and Local Councils at lower levels. 
Consider that some district staff such as the district assistant engineer report 
directly to the Ministry of Education and Sports whereas others report to the CAO. 
There is also an uncertain relationship between staff of the Teacher Development 
and Management System (TDMS) and the DEO. This lack of clarity at the TDMS 
may not facilitate the tailoring of personnel training to the needs of the district. 
The responsibility of the Coordinating Center Tutor (CCT) at the district has come 
into question: some DEOs want the tutor to report to the district administrative 
office rather than to the Elementary Teacher College (PTC). Overlapping 
responsibilities and role conflicts characterize decentralization of education in 
Cameroon and Colombia as well (UNESCO, 2004). More explicit defining and 
some revising are needed to eliminate confusion about responsibilities for 
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reporting, management and accountability.  
There is a concern that over-proliferation of conditional grants is not 
promoting good governance and has a negative impact on service delivery. The 
conditional grant for construction (SFG) functions reasonably well, but it has an 
unclear relationship with the Local Government Act. The UPE capitation grant 
suffers from serious delays at the district level, and from non-compliance with 
administrative guidelines (USAID, 2000). Guidelines for both grants are seen as 
excessively rigid. A number of reforms have been directly affected by 
decentralization. 
 
Decentralization as an Educational Reform: A Way Forward 
Given Uganda’s background of political and economic instability, and the 
continued instabilities in some areas of the country, a balance between national 
crisis and political stability is a factor in the success of decentralization. One 
hopes that with any change of governance, the next political leaders will have the 
will to evaluate the successes and failures of the decentralization reform initiative.  
Decentralizing the education system in Uganda makes sense as a 
politically motivated development. Quantitative benefits are evident. 
Decentralization has led to increased enrollment and resource flow at the 
elementary level. Educators need to determine how to maximize the benefits of 
the process. More infrastructure and analyses need to be put in place to ensure that 
the perceived benefits such as increased diversity and community participation are 
realized. It is in this way that educationalists will turn this political and economic 
agenda into a curricular reform. 
Educational leaders and personnel at the various levels will continue to 
be challenged by the implementation of decentralization. There is a need to work 
through the conceptualization of decentralizing education, to identify and 
eliminate impediments to its effectiveness. There is need to reflect on the inherent 
risks of decentralizing much less privatizing important services such as education. 
Although it might be the case that delivery of feeder roads as a basic service is 
facilitated by decentralizing governance, education service delivery is much more 
complex. 
Improvement in the quality of education has been slow. This is evidenced 
by minimal changes in curriculum taught. Declining quality in education has 
already deterred affluent parents from keeping children in public schools. 
Educators could focus on qualitative indicators such as relevance of education 
curricula, increased productivity of school graduates, increased retention rates and 
literacy rates (Deininger, 2003; McGee, 2000). 
Resources have been assigned to basic education to the detriment of other 
levels and other public services as is the case in Morocco (UNESCO, 2004). In 
Uganda decentralization has been reduced to districtization and as such blocked 
development at the lower levels (UNESCO, 2004). In the new organization 
structure there appears to be a void between the schools and the district level that 
could usefully be filled by an equivalence of an educational board, a group of 
schools. Boards would have a better capacity to interact and negotiate with the 
districts governments than individual schools. 
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The conception that decentralization would eliminate what it saw as 
unnecessary bureaucratic channels and reduce corruption by minimizing the 
number of centralized office levels to be consulted was mistaken. It is still too 
early to determine whether the goals of boosting the level of monitoring; the goal 
of managing school according to local priorities; the goal of improving financial 
accountability; and the goal of raising local revenue to fund services have been 
achieved.  
Many criteria for successful decentralization would reveal that Uganda 
was not ready for decentralization. The central government was not yet stable 
especially as regards to resolving military conflicts in the North and East.  Many 
local authorities were not yet able to assume administrative and financial 
responsibilities (UNESCO, 2004). However, the stable macroeconomic 
environment; priority for education, political will, robust budget processes, and 
the interest of multilateral donor agencies in decentralization (Murphy, 2005; 
UNESCO, 2004) were central in the implementation of decentralization.  
Decentralizing education raises questions some of which are unique to 
developing countries. With the population size of Uganda close to 30 million 
people (See Table 1; FAO, 2005) decentralizing governance seems helpful. 
However the size of the country in terms of area and GNP does not appear to 
warrant regional and economic decentralization. To perceive decentralization as a 




CAO  Chief Administrative Officer  
CC Coordinating Center 
CCT                 Coordinating Center Tutor 
CAO Chief Administrative Officer 
DECBP District Education Capacity Building Programme 
DEO District Education Officer 
DIS District Inspector of Schools 
EMIS Education Management Information System 
EPRC  Education Policy Review Commission  
ESIP Education Strategic Investment Plan 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
LC Local Council 
MoES Ministry of Education and Sports, Uganda 
MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
MoLG Ministry of Local Government  
NCDC National Curriculum Development Center 
NRM National Resistance Movement 
PAF Poverty Alleviation Fund 
PTA Parent Teacher Association 
PTC  Primary Teacher College 
TDMS Teacher Development and Management System  
SFG School Facilities Grant  
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SMC School Management Committee 
UNEB Uganda National Examinations Board 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
  Organization 
UPE  Universal Primary Education 
USAID US Agency for International Development 
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